In Critical Theory and the Mangle of Digital Humanities, Todd Presner, following Alan Liu, argues that the digital humanities remains caught in a materialist epistemology that focuses on the activities of building and making that seems to put it at odds with the humanistic tradition of critique. The focus on new digital methods of humanistic work has taken a privileged place over “attention to the conditions of their possibility, their social and culture contingency, and finally, their transformative potentiality” (Presner, 59). He points out that technical tools and methods are always situated within organizations of power that set the limits of resistance and accommodation in what is or is not allowed in the scientific practice at hand. Thus, we need some form of interpretation and that passes through modes of analysis like Foucauldian genealogy and Frankfurt school critical theory to scope out the limits of what we do in the digital humanities, a scoping out that not only limits, but also reveals new possibilities for the digital humanities that would not have been possible before.
Since Presner published this chapter in 2015, it seems like there has been a lot more work done in this spirit. In the successive editions of the Debates in the Digital Humanities series, from 2012 to 2016 to 2019, there has been a shift to a more culturally critical lens. It seems as though the field is no longer content with merely tacking questions of power, race, and gender onto to discourse on the field after the fact, but rather is making a critique based on these vectors central to the field itself. There are lots of writings about how digital tools and methods reaffirm structural biases or contribute to state surveillance or do violence toward indigenous people through archiving their culture.
There seems, at this point, to be an abundance of thinking through the digital humanities in light of critical theory. What appears to be missing the first part of the the culture of critique that Presner writes is missing from the field. He writes of the “Marxist-inflected social and cultural criticism”, “deconstructive critique”, and “Enlightenment ideals of rational subjects engaging in critique”, but it is only the first two that I see serious thought put into (Presner, 55). It seems like a problem with the humanities as a whole is a neurotic focus on the social conditions of experience and what we have lost is a more phenomenological epistemology that investigates the somatic and spiritual dimensions of life. Any epistemology and critique of digital humanities work would be incomplete without both of these parts of the critique: the socio-historical and the phenomenological. The structures of power are obviously essential, but we must understand how they produce and reproduce behavior through understanding how the psychosocial circuits they construct actually work.
This bears resonance with the points made by Bernard Stiegler in a lecture on the digital humanities that he delivered in 2014. He argues that we need to rethink the digitalization of knowledge in light of the Husserlian phenomenology of knowledge, especially since the Derridean critique of Husserl. Even the distinction Presner makes between the materialist epistemology of building and making in DH and the mental work of interpretation and critique reflects a repeating of the binary between mind and body that Western philosophy has been deconstructing since Hegel. It reflects the lack of a deeper engagement with the history of philosophy that might reveal that all academic and theoretical work has been conditions by technical constraints, and that digitalization would only appear as a transformation of that relationship. I think that Presner opens up an important conversation here, but one that needs to be taken further. This is obviously beyond the scope of this blog post, but it is one I believe to be essential if the digital humanities is to be able to rethink “the public sphere and knowledge systems…while also imagining possibilities for meteorological knowledge rooted in an ethic of participation without condition” (Presner, 56).
Stiegler’s lecture: https://www.academia.edu/12692243/Bernard_Stiegler_Digital_Humanities_2014_





